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Abstract 
 
The current study explored the influence of trust 
and distrust behaviors on affect over time. We 
examined the differences in affect when participants 
(N=97) were paired with a human or a robot while 
playing a modified version of the investor game. 
Results indicated that there were no differences in 
affect between partner types when the partner 
performed a trustful behavior. When the partner 
performed a distrustful behavior, positive affect was 
higher for human partners than for robot partners. 
When robot partners performed a distrustful 
behavior, negative affect had a steeper incline 
compared to human partners. These findings suggest 
that people are more sensitive to distrust behaviors 
that are performed by a robot over a human. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Automation is becoming ever more intertwined 
with our day-to-day experiences. Engineers, 
researchers, roboticists, and designers are working 
together to examine how to improve human 
experiences with automation. The goals of these 
interactions vary depending on the context. For 
example, when interacting with self-driving cars, 
design goals are user safety and preserving calibrated 
user trust in the car’s automation. In comparison, 
when interacting with a social robot, the design goals 
may be user entertainment and efficient information 
sharing between the user and the robot. Researchers 
are interested in the factors that influence these 
human-automation (H-A) interactions. The more 
industry knows about factors that influence these 
interactions, the more they can improve automation 
so that it is operating at an optimal level for each 
user and context. 
One of these factors that influence human- 
automation interaction is trust. Users are less likely to 
rely on automated systems and robots that they do not 
trust [1]. Additionally, research has shown that when 
teammates trust a robot, performance on tasks is better 
compared to when teammates distrust robots [2; 3]. 
Another factor that has influenced human-
automation interactions is affect (e.g., [4]). Similar to 
when people interact with one another, the emotions 
experienced while engaging with automation and robots 
can influence that interaction in both positive and 
negative ways. Further, people may experience different 
affective responses depending on whether they trust or 
distrust an automated referent [1]. In this paper, we 
discuss the roles of trust and affect in human-human (H-
H) versus H-A interactions. Our main goal is to examine 
the effect of trust manipulations on affect. 
 
1.1. Trust 
 
Trust is defined as a willingness to be 
vulnerable to another with the expectation of a 
positive outcome [3]. A trustor is the person 
engaging in trusting intentions or actions, and a 
trustee is the referent or object of trust. Mayer and 
colleagues [5] proposed a model of the trust process 
that explicates trust from its antecedents, namely 
the trustor’s propensity to trust (i.e., a general 
tendency to trust others) and the trustor’s perceived 
trustworthiness of the trustee (i.e., characteristics of 
trustees that influence how trustworthy they appear 
to the trustor). These antecedents influence the
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trustor’s willingness to be vulnerable (i.e., trust 
intention), which leads to reliance behaviors (i.e., 
the behavioral outcomes attributed to a trust 
intention). There is a considerable amount of 
empirical research that has examined the trust 
process in H-H interactions. However, there is 
comparatively less research that has examined 
differences in the trust process in H-H versus H-A 
interactions. 
Although people apply social norms to human- 
automation interactions (e.g., [6]), there may be 
differences between how humans trust one another 
and how humans trust automation. Madhaven and 
Weigmann [7] described the similarities and 
differences in these two types of interactions. 
People commit the fundamental attribution error 
when engaging with both humans and automation. 
That is, whether the referent is a person or an 
automated system, people attribute undesirable 
behaviors to the referent’s personality (or the entire 
system in the case of automation) instead of 
situational circumstances. However, differences 
between H-H and H-A interactions reside in the 
trust process itself, mainly trust building and 
decaying over time. In interpersonal interactions, 
people are more cautious in the beginning of a 
relationship: it takes longer to build a relationship 
and to establish trust between two people. In H-A 
interactions, there is an automation bias (e.g., [8]) 
where humans trust automation more than humans 
in initial interactions [7]. This is also similar to a 
bias known as perfect automation schema [9]. 
Perfect automation schema is the belief that 
automated systems perform without errors and have 
better, more reliable performance than humans. 
Thus, people are more forgiving of humans when 
they make a mistake or perform contrary to their 
expectations. It is easier for people to rationalize 
humans’ actions. In comparison, if a system or robot 
makes a mistake, people’s trust in that system 
dramatically decreases. Compared to H-A 
interactions, in H-H interactions, it takes longer for 
trust to decrease and a shorter time to recover over 
the course of a relationship [7]. In both H-H and H-
A interactions, changes in perceived trustworthiness 
might influence self-reported affect. 
 
1.2. Positive and Negative Affect 
 
Emotions are “organized responses, crossing the 
boundaries of many psychological subsystems, 
including the physiological, cognitive, motivational, 
and experiential systems. Emotions typically arise in 
response to an event, either internal or external, that 
has a positively or negatively valanced meaning for 
the individual” [10]. Emotions vary on two 
dimensions: arousal and valence. Arousal, or intensity 
of the emotion, ranges from low to high. Valence 
ranges from positive to negative. Positively valanced 
emotions (i.e., positive affect) are described as happy, 
enthusiastic, and alert. Examples of negatively 
valanced emotions (i.e., negative affect) are anger, 
fear, and disgust [11]. People use both affect and 
cognition to help interpret situations and aid in 
decision-making [12]. For example, if people feel 
emotionally connected to robots, their perceived 
trustworthiness of the robot may increase [2; 13], 
demonstrating that positive affect (PA) may affect 
judgments towards robots. Thus, interplay of affect 
and trust is an important consideration for trust 
research. 
 
1.2.1. Positive Affect and Trust 
 
Researchers have found that participants who 
experienced PA (e.g., happiness) rated referents as 
more trustworthy compared to participants who 
experienced 
negative affect (NA), namely anger [14]. 
Furthermore, affect influenced trust only when 
participants rated someone who was unfamiliar to 
them, such as an acquaintance compared to a familiar 
person. Similarly, 
[15] primed participants with PA or NA prior to an 
experimental task. They found that participants who 
were assigned to the PA condition reported feeling 
PA prior to an automated convoy task and reported 
higher trust in an automated decision aid during the 
task. However, these effects were only demonstrated 
in the first session. The subsequent two sessions that 
participants completed did not show this effect. It 
appears that affect only influences initial trust, or 
trust from the most recent transaction. As people 
acquire more information about the referent, other 
factors become significant predictors of trust other 
than affect. Lount [16] reported that when 
participants were provided with information on how 
trustworthy their partner was via self-report scores in 
a trust game, there was an interaction between affect 
and how much money the participants sent to their 
partners. When participants were in a positive 
affective state, they sent more money to trustworthy 
partners, compared to participants who experience 
neutral affect, in which there were no differences in 
how much money they sent to their partners. 
These studies demonstrate that PA influences 
trust in a relationship when people have little 
information about their partners. The current study 
investigates a different directional hypothesis—the 
role of trust and distrust manipulations on affective 
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responses. Though the relationship between trust 
and affect has been examined in the 
aforementioned research [2; 3; 13; 14; 15; 16], the 
current study wishes to narrow focus on the effect of 
trust manipulations on affect, and how biases 
towards humans and robots affect these  
relationships. 
 
1.2.2. Negative Affect and Trust 
 
In our review of the published literature on 
emotions and trust in the context of game theory, 
anger was the most discussed and prevalent negative 
affect emotion. In particular, anger can be triggered 
by low offers from the trustor in Trust and Ultimatum 
games [17]. Games such as the Trust, Ultimatum, and 
Investor/Dictator games are games in which usually 
two people exchange money between one another to 
study fairness, trust, and self-interest [17]. The first 
player (e.g., trustor, prosper, or investor), is given 
money from the experimenter at the start of the 
session and told he/she can split it with the second 
player (e.g., trustee, dictator, or responder). 
Depending on the game, the session can last one or 
multiple rounds. The trustee can choose to accept the 
offer or reject it and the game ends (Ultimatum and 
Investor/Dictator game), or the money is tripled each 
time it is passed to each player and the players have 
the option to stop the game at any point and take the 
entire earnings (Trust game). Hewig and colleagues 
[18] studied how participants felt after playing both 
the Ultimatum and Dictator games. Results indicated 
that as unfair offers increased, participants reported 
more negative emotions. 
Pillutla and Murnighan [19] examined the effect 
participants’ anger had on their rejections when their 
partner in the Ultimatum game made an unfair offer. 
Results indicated that anger and unfairness were 
significantly, positively correlated, such that as unfair 
offers increased, so did anger. These two studies 
examined how NA can influence how participants 
behave while playing games designed to study trust. 
Anger in particular was positively correlated with 
higher rejection rates. One explanation is that 
participants felt as though they were being treated 
unfairly. However, these studies only compared H-H 
dyads and did not examine H-A pairs. 
In an effort to study the role of biases in H-H pairs 
compared to H-A pairs, researchers compared how 
humans responded both behaviorally and 
physiologically when playing the Ultimatum game 
with both human and computer partners [20]. When 
participants received a low, unfair offer of money 
from their partners, participants were more likely to 
reject those offers in the H-H condition when 
compared to the human-computer condition. Also, 
participants had high emotional arousal as measured 
by skin conductivity when they were offered low offers 
from another human. Conversely, when participants 
played with a computer partner, there were no 
differences in emotional arousal. These results could 
be because people perceived the computer as fair and 
thus failed to experience negative emotions. The 
current study seeks to investigate these effects over 
time. Specifically, we explored the effects of trust 
manipulations on affect over time, and how this 
relationship is moderated by characteristics of the 
partner (human vs automation). 
 
1.3. The Current Study 
 
The aim of the current study is to examine the 
change in affect over time in unfamiliar H-H and 
human-robot (H-R) interactions. We examined self-
reported state affect changes when participants’ 
partners display trustful and distrustful behaviors. 
Before making directional hypotheses, the task should 
be explained so there is more context for each 
hypothesis. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Participants were 97 adults recruited from a 
Midwestern college. Participants were randomly 
distributed among the four experimental conditions: 
Trust-Human (n = 23), Distrust-Human (n = 22), 
Trust- Robot (n = 25), or Distrust-Robot (n = 27). 
Ages ranged from 18-41 years (M = 22.82 years, SD 
= 4.68 years). Most (59%) were female and white 
(41%). Participants were recruited from the 
Introduction to Psychology participant pool, flyers, 
email, and word of mouth. Participants received 
compensation in the form of a $30 gift card, as well 
as cash payment for all money earned during the 
task. The study was overseen by the institutional 
review board. 
 
2.2. Task 
 
The task played in the current study is called 
Checkmate [21]. It is a computer game played 
between two players. Checkmate is a modified 
version of the investor/dictator game [22]. In the 
current study, the participant was assigned the role of 
the “Banker” (investor in the investment/dictator 
game) and a robot or confederate played the role of 
the “Runner” (dictator in the investment/dictator 
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game). The role of the Banker was to loan money to 
the Runner over the course of five rounds. The role 
of the Runner was to collect boxes in a virtual maze 
over the course of five rounds. The number of boxes 
collected by the Runner reflected performance. The 
initial amount of money in the Banker’s virtual 
account was set at $50. The Bankers loaned money 
to the Runner each round in anticipation of earning 
interest on their investment. Each round the Banker 
chose to loan one of three amounts to the Runner: 
small ($1-$7), medium ($4-$10), or large ($7-$13). 
Based on their selections, a pre-determined 
algorithm specified the exact dollar amount that 
would be sent to the Runner. 
The Runner chose a risk level for the purpose 
of potentially increasing the initial loan amount. 
The risk levels were low (75-150%), moderate (50- 
200%), and high (0-300%). The Runner could earn 
more money by choosing a higher risk level, but 
the Runner risked not earning any money at all if 
his performance was poor. If the Runner decided 
to err on the side of caution and chose a low risk 
level, the maximum amount of money the Runner 
lost was 25% without collecting any boxes or 
gained 50% by performing well. 
At the beginning of the round, the Runner chose a 
risk level. The Runner then promised to return the 
initial loan and 50% of the earnings to the Banker. 
The Banker was notified via a pop-up message 
which risk level the Runner selected, as well as how 
much of the invested money the Runner promised to 
return. At this point in the round, the Banker 
selected an amount to loan to the Runner. Money 
was then transferred into the Runner’s virtual wallet. 
The maze-running task began, and the Banker was 
able to watch a top-down video of the Runner’s 
progress. The Runner was allotted two minutes to 
collect as many boxes as possible. After the maze-
running task was over, the Runner then decided how 
much money to return to the Banker. The Banker 
received a pop-up message of the exact amount of 
money the Runner decided to return. If the amount 
returned was within the range of what the Runner 
had promised, then the Banker could assume that 
the Runner was trustworthy. However, if the return 
amount was lower than promised, then the Banker 
might assume that 1) the Runner may have not 
earned enough money to return and keep their 
promise, or 2) the Runner is playing unfairly by 
keeping more money for themselves, which could 
signal that the Runner is distrustful. 
The steps outlined above were repeated over six 
rounds, which we coded as zero to five. Participants 
were informed that the amount of money the Banker 
had in his/her virtual bank at the end of the session 
belonged to the Banker, and the earnings were paid out 
in the form of cash, rounded up to the nearest quarter. 
 
2.3. Manipulations 
 
Typically, Checkmate [21] is played between two 
people. For this study, the participant was always the 
Banker, and the Runner was either a Nao robot (see 
Figure 1) or a male confederate. The Runner’s risk 
level in the game was set to medium-risk for every 
round. All the Runner’s data, including maze 
performance and returning of investment to Banker, 
was prerecorded. This level of control allowed a focus 
on the way that participants trusted their partner. 
However, participants were led to believe they were 
playing in real time with either the robot or the human. 
Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions: trust or distrust. 
In the trust condition, the Runner always returned the 
amount of money that was promised for rounds 0-5. In 
the distrust condition, the Runner returned less money 
than he promised for rounds 3 and 4. 
 
2.4. Measures 
 
2.4.1. Affect. 
 
State affect was measured using the shortened 10- 
item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; [11]). Participants were instructed to 
indicate the extent they felt in the present moment 
using a 5-point response scale (1 = very slightly or 
not at all, 5 = extremely). Scores were computed by 
averaging responses for the positive and negative 
affective words separately so that each participant 
had an independent average score for both PA and 
NA for rounds 0-5. 
Positive affect (PA) items included Interested, 
Excited, Enthusiastic, Alert, and Determined. Scale 
reliabilities are as follows: Round 0 (α = .87); Round 
1 (α = .90); Round 2 (α = .88); Round 3 (α = .88); 
Round 4 (α = .89); Round 5 (α = .89). 
Negative affect (NA) items included Distressed, 
Upset, Irritable, Nervous, and Jittery. Scale 
reliabilities are as follows: Round 0 (α = .76); 
Round 1 (α = .61); Round 2 (α = .71); Round 3 (α = 
.72); Round 4 (α = .74); Round 5 (α = .76). 
 
2.4.2. Time. 
 
Time was classified at each round. The practice 
round was coded as Time 0 and the five subsequent 
rounds were coded as Time 1-5. 
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 Figure 1. NAO robot; partner in robot 
condition. 
 
2.5. Procedure 
 
Participants were run individually in a two-room 
laboratory. First, they were introduced to their partner 
(robot or confederate). In the robot condition, the 
robot was located in the back room of the computer 
lab. The participants were told they were going to 
meet the other participant for the study, and then 
walked into the back room to meet the robot. The 
experimenter tapped the robot on the head, which 
initiated the following speech and behavior. The 
robot stood up and became animated and said the 
following, “Thanks for waking me up 
[experimenter’s name]. Hi, I’m Rufus. It’s nice to 
meet you. Time to get to work.” Then the robot 
returned to the crouching position. In the human 
condition, participants were introduced to each other 
once they entered the lab together and then seated in 
separate rooms. 
After providing informed consent, participants 
completed demographic surveys, then completed an 
endowment earning task, which consisted of five, 
medium-difficulty, multiple choice math problems. 
The purpose of this task was to make participants feel 
like they earned the money. Because the money in the 
task was in a virtual bank, we wanted to make this 
connection as salient as possible. Participants were 
told that based on their performance they would earn 
money towards the main task if they answered at least 
three out of five of the questions correctly. However, 
all participants earned $50 regardless of their 
performance in order to ensure experimental control. 
After the math task, in the robot condition, the 
experimenter read a backstory on Rufus aloud to 
participants, “The military currently integrates 
automation into dangerous scenarios alongside 
humans. Automation is useful in high-risk scenarios, 
such as disabling explosive devices, navigating 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and carrying 
heavy equipment. However, automation is expensive 
and takes time to develop. As such, the military is 
testing automated robots containing self- preservation 
algorithms. This means the military is creating robots 
that should be able to make decisions to protect 
themselves, as well as other humans around them. If a 
situation is too dangerous, the robot should take proper 
precautions to minimize damages to itself. The current 
study uses the same algorithms to aid the robot’s 
decision-making when teamed with another human in a 
maze-running task. Keep in mind that Rufus the robot 
may act self-interested, meaning he may prioritize 
himself over you.” 
Next, participants completed training on 
Checkmate, then played a practice round of 
Checkmate with their partner. Participants were told 
prior to coming in that they were randomly selected to 
play the Banker for the real session of five rounds and 
their partner was selected to play the Runner. 
Following practice (Time 0), participants completed 
the state affect questionnaire. Each round lasted 
approximately three to five minutes. Following each 
round (Time 1-5), participants were asked to complete 
the state affect survey. After the competition of the 
fifth round, participants were debriefed and paid for 
their time with a $30 gift card. The money in their 
virtual wallet was paid to them in cash. 
 
2.6. Research Design and Analysis 
 
We tested changes in self-reported affect over 
time across the Condition (Trust vs Distrust) and 
Partner (Human vs Robot) factors using growth 
curve models 
[23] in the nlme package in R [24; 25]. Growth curve 
models have benefits over repeated measures 
ANOVA (e.g., more relaxed model assumptions, 
ability to handle missing data, ability to model 
individual growth patterns). In general, there are two 
levels to growth models. Level-1 variables 
correspond to time-level variables (e.g., time, time-
variant covariates), whereas Level-2 variables occur 
at the person level (e.g., time- invariant covariates). 
In the current models, we denoted three random 
effects (i.e., intercept variance, a quadratic time term 
variance, and a cubic time term variance). Random 
slope variance (i.e., random quadratic and cubic 
effects) allow each person to have his or her unique 
growth estimate. Then, we predicted that individual 
growth curve with person-level variables (i.e., 
partner type and condition). 
Overall, we expected a linear change over time 
for the trust condition and a cubic change over time 
for the distrust condition. In general, polynomial 
terms model deviations from the typical linear 
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regression. The number of “bends” modeled in the 
growth curve can be calculated by subtracting one 
from the polynomial term. For example, a cubic 
term allows the slope to bend twice. In the distrust 
condition specifically, we expected that PA would 
increase for the first three rounds, decrease after the 
two distrust behaviors, and then increase after the 
final trust behavior (i.e., a cubic slope). We expected 
the opposite pattern for the NA model (i.e., an initial 
decrease in NA, a sharp increase in NA following 
the two distrust behaviors, and finally a decrease in 
NA after the final trusting behavior). We also 
predicted that NA would rise steeper following a 
distrust behavior when the partner type was human, 
given that people ascribe their feelings of anger and 
spite to humans more than automation [20]. Thus, 
our hypotheses are as follows: 
RQ: Are there differences in PA and NA for partner 
type for Time 0-2? 
H1: In both conditions, PA will increase for 
Time 0-2. 
H2: In the distrust condition, PA will decrease for 
Time 3 and Time 4, and increase in Time 5. 
H3: In the distrust condition, PA will decrease 
more over time when the partner is a human 
compared to a robot. 
H4: In the distrust condition, PA will be higher 
for robot than human 
H5: In both conditions, NA will decrease for 
Time 0-2. 
H6: In the distrust condition, NA will increase 
for Time 3 and Time 4, and decrease in Time 5. 
H7: In the distrust condition, NA will increase 
more if the partner is a human compared to a robot. 
H8: In the distrust condition, NA will be higher 
for human than robot. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Positive Affect 
 
First, we determined whether the intraclass 
correlation (ICC) was large enough to allow each 
person to have a unique initial PA score. We found an 
ICC score of .64, which supports a free intercept 
model (i.e., allowing each participant to have a unique 
starting PA score). We observed significant estimates 
for time (B = 0.46, t(473) = 5.67, p < .01), the 
quadratic term for the distrust condition (B = -0.09, 
t(473) = -2.98, p < .01), and the cubic term for the 
distrust condition (B = 0.01, t(473) = 2.49, p < .05). 
Stated simply, participants across both trust and 
distrust conditions showed a significant increase in 
PA across the first three trials (Time 0-2), supporting 
Hypothesis 1. Participants assigned to the distrust 
condition showed a significant decrease in PA 
following the distrust behaviors, and then a significant 
increase in PA following the final trust behavior (see 
Figure 2). Hypothesis 2 was supported. We also found 
evidence of auto-correlated errors, ∆ꭓ2(1)= 11.37, p  < 
.01, so we included this term in the model. This 
accounts for the measurement errors of proximal time 
points having stronger correlations with each other 
than measurements more distally spaced in time. We 
found no evidence of violation of the homoscedasticity 
assumption, so we excluded it from the model. We 
found no significant differences in quadratic or cubic 
time between partner types (see Table 1). Hypotheses 
3 and 4 were not supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Change in positive affect over time in 
the distrust condition (top) and the trust 
condition. 
 
3.2. Negative Affect 
 
We followed the same steps for testing differences 
in NA as described in the PA section above. We 
observed an intraclass correlation (ICC) of .55, so we 
allowed the intercepts to vary across people. We 
observed a significant estimate for time (B = -0.62, 
t(473) = -8.57, p < .01), a significant quadratic term 
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for the distrust condition (B = 0.13, t(473) = 4.48, p < 
.01), and a significant cubic term for the distrust 
condition (B = - 0.02, t(473) = -4.14, p < .01). 
Participants across both conditions showed a decrease 
in NA across the first three trials. Hypothesis 5 was 
supported. Then, those assigned to the distrust 
condition showed a significant increase in NA 
following the distrust behaviors, and a significant 
decrease in NA following the final trust behavior (see 
Figure 3). Hypothesis 6 was supported. We found 
evidence of violation to the assumption of 
homoscedasticity of the errors, ∆ꭓ2(1) = 9.18, p < .01, so  
we included this term in the model [23]. We observed no 
significant differences in human and robot partners on 
decreases in NA across the first three time points. In the 
distrust condition, the increase in NA after the distrust 
behaviors was stronger for the robot condition, γ = 0.12, 
t(468) = 2.03, p < .05. Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
The decrease in NA following the final trust behavior was 
also steeper for the robot partner type, γ =-0.02, t(468) = -
2.21, p < .05. Hypothesis 8 was not supported. Note that 
these findings were the opposite of the predicted 
pattern.  
Figure 3. Change in NA over time in the 
distrust condition (top) and the trust condition 
(bottom). 
Table 1 
  Positive Affect Changes Over Time  
 Estimate SE df t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 3.42 0.20 468 17.48 .00 
Time 0.61 0.12 468 4.95 .00 
Time2 -0.24 0.07 468 -3.59 .00 
Time3 0.03 0.01 468 2.87 .00 
Partner 0.24 0.27 93 0.88 .38 
Trust 0.21 0.27 93 0.75 .45 
Time:Partner -0.29 0.17 468 -1.73 .09 
Time2:Trust -0.12 0.05 468 -2.49 .01 
Partner:Time2 0.14 0.09 468 1.58 .12 
Partner:Trust -0.56 0.37 93 -1.49 .14 
Trust: Time3 0.02 0.01 468 2.25 .02 
Partner: Time3 -0.02 0.01 468 -1.33 .19 
Partner:Time2:Trust 0.04 0.06 468 0.55 .58 
Partner:Trust: Time3 -0.01 0.01 468 -0.67 .51 
Note. Time = linear change. Time2 = quadratic change. Time3 = cubic change. Partner = Human vs. Robot. 
Robot was the reference group. Trust = Distrust was the reference group. 
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Table 2 
Negative Affect Changes Over Time 
 
 Estimate SE df t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 2.25 0.13 468.00 16.99 .00 
Time -0.62 0.11 468.00 -5.39 .00 
Time2 0.24 0.06 468.00 4.01 .00 
Time3 -0.03 0.01 468.00 -3.55 .00 
Partner -0.26 0.18 93.00 -1.42 .16 
Trust -0.23 0.18 93.00 -1.31 .19 
Time:Partner -0.01 0.16 468.00 -0.07 .94 
Time2:Trust 0.08 0.04 468.00 1.83 .07 
Partner:Time2 -0.04 0.08 468.00 -0.47 .64 
Partner:Trust -0.01 0.24 93.00 -0.04 .96 
Trust: Time3 -0.01 0.01 468.00 -1.52 .13 
Partner: Time3 0.01 0.01 468.00 0.80 .42 
Partner:Time2:Trust 0.12 0.06 468.00 2.03 .04 
Partner:Trust: Time3 -0.02 0.01 468.00 -2.21 .03 
Note. Time = linear change. Time2 = quadratic change. Time3 = cubic change. Partner = Human vs. Robot. 
Robot was the reference group. Trust = Distrust was the reference group. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Overall, we expected participants to report increased 
PA, and decreased NA, when participants experienced 
a trust behavior. Additionally, we predicted that when 
participants were paired with a human partner, 
participants would have steeper changes in affect 
following a distrust behavior compared to a robot 
partner. As hypothesized, we found that PA had a 
linear relationship with time, such that PA increased 
for the first three time points in both conditions, 
regardless of partner type. Just as PA increased for 
the first three rounds in both conditions, NA 
decreased for Time 0-2, demonstrating an expected 
negative relationship between PA and NA. This is 
understandable, as the first three time points were all 
trust behaviors. For Time 3 and Time 4 in the distrust 
condition, PA decreased and NA increased when the 
participants received less money back than promised 
from their partners. During the final round (Time 5), 
when the partner once again returned the amount of 
money that was promised, PA increased and NA 
decreased. However, contrary to our hypotheses, the 
change in PA in the distrust condition, depending on 
partner type, was non-significant. There were no 
differences in PA when participants’ partner was a 
human or a robot. There was a significant change in 
NA in the distrust condition, although it was in the 
opposite direction we hypothesized. Specifically, NA 
increased more when the partner was a robot 
compared to a human, and PA was higher when 
partner type was a human compared to a robot. These 
results contradict what past researchers have found 
[20]. One reason for this could be that the type of 
automation  that  used  was a computer [20], and we  
 
 
 
 
used a robot. As automation becomes more 
anthropomorphized, people ascribe more human-like 
qualities to the referent [6, 26]. As such, people may  
attribute will and autonomy to robots more than they 
do computers. Additionally, these differences may have 
been due to differences in the task. Future research 
should compare various types of automation to a 
human partner in a variety of tasks to examine the 
effects of anthropomorphism on affect. 
Pulling from the social science literature, another 
reason that these results could have occurred is due to 
person-positivity bias [27]. This means that people 
generally believe the best in people and are optimistic 
about others’ intentions. Similarly, the mere-exposure 
effect [28], sometimes referred to as the familiarity 
principle, posits that people rate others and objects more 
positively when they are familiar with them. In this 
study, the partner type was either a human or a robot. As 
the participants were human, they were more familiar 
with the human partner compared to a robot partner. 
Therefore, one reason that the participants experienced 
less PA and more NA when their partner was a robot is 
because, presumably, they have had limited exposure to 
anthropomorphized robots. 
Finally, the current findings align with prior 
research on automation bias [8; 29]. If participants 
perceived the robot partner as being perfectly 
reliable, they may have experienced increased NA 
following a distrust behavior due to violations of this 
heuristic. It is noteworthy, however, that NA 
decreased more for the robot partner compared to the  
human partner for the trust behavior following the 
distrust behaviors. We would expect that violations 
to the perfect automation schema would result in a 
slower decrease in NA in trust recovery compared to 
a human partner. 
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A limitation of this study, however, was that it 
only contained a total of six measurement time 
points. In order to gain a better understanding of 
how trust behaviors influence affect over time, more 
instances of trust and distrust should be included. 
Specifically, we may have observed a different 
pattern in affect amongst the trust recovery process 
with more time points included after time point four. 
However, to our knowledge, this is one of the few 
studies that has measured affect over several time 
points, whereas most studies are cross-sectional. 
Another limitation of the current study is the 
sample size. Although researchers are unsure of the 
exact sample size required for growth curve models 
[30], a larger sample size may be needed given our 
limited number of measurements and the cubic 
nature of the change for those assigned to the 
distrust conditions. We should note, however, that 
the number of longitudinal studies on comparing H-
H and H-R trust has been minimal. 
A third limitation concerns our sample of 
participants. This was a convenience sample of 
mostly college students from a Midwestern 
university. Previous researchers have demonstrated 
that while recruiting participants using various 
methods such as crowd- soured websites like 
Amazon Mechanical Turk or social media postings 
on platforms such as Twitter or Reddit result in 
more diverse samples compared to college student 
samples, results from an in-lab behavioral study with 
college students had almost identical results when it 
was adapted for a computer and administered online 
to participants from crowd-sourced and social media 
outlets [31]. However, our research may not 
generalize to H-R teams using people in HRI in the 
real world. 
We used a shortened version of the PANAS [11], 
and some items may have been ambiguous in the 
current context. For example, some item stems (e.g., 
Distressed, Nervous, Jittery in the NA scale; Excited, 
Enthusiastic within the PA scale) may have been 
inappropriate for this context, because the task itself 
did not lend itself to evoke these emotions. Future 
research may benefit from using all 20 items or 
selecting affect items that are more likely to be 
experienced during the task. 
Finally, we omitted the relationship between 
affect and actual participant behavior. The statistical 
models used in the current study were complex, and 
analyses on categorical behavioral outcomes only 
add to the complexity. Moreover, the addition of 
these analyses were outside the scope of this study 
which focused on the effects of a trust manipulation 
on affect. Given the practical significance of the 
effects of PA and NA on perception and behaviors 
[32]; future research should examine behaviors when 
comparing affective outcomes across human and 
robot partners. 
This study demonstrated the influence of trust and 
distrust behaviors on affect over time. This research 
is important because affect is essential to judgement, 
decision-making, and reasoning [33]. The 
implications for this research concern the affective 
responses that are attributed to trust manipulations. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, trust violations led to 
increased NA responses when the human was 
partnered with a robot. We postulate this may be due 
to more severe decay of trust when an automated aid 
fails to perform as expected [7], and this in turn may 
lead to a negative affective response. Note, however, 
that this increase in NA may be beneficial, as prior 
research has found that NA has related to higher 
attention to specific details (e.g., [34]). However, 
violations to the perfect automation schema may lead 
to automation disuse [9]. Future work may consider 
these affective responses differing between humans 
and robots. When training teams comprising humans 
and automated assistants, researchers should note 
that a loss of trust between each referent may lead to 
different affective responses, and this trajectory may 
vary over time and have differing consequences for 
team-based tasks. 
This research demonstrated that when robot 
partners engage in distrust behaviors, humans 
experience more NA compared to human partners. 
When users experience NA, they may be less likely to 
interact with robots. Designers should increase 
transparency and make sure that users understand the 
capabilities of the robot in order to reduce instances of 
NA and promote successful interactions. 
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